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Abstract: In Finland, as well as all over the globe, great weight is put on the possibilities of large data
collections and ‘big data’ for generating economic growth, enhancing medical research, and boosting
health and wellbeing in totally new ways. This massive data gathering and usage is justiﬁed by the
moral principle of improving health. The imperative of health thus legitimizes data collection, new
infrastructures and innovation policy. It is also supported by the rhetoric of health promotion. New
arrangements in health research and innovations in the health sector are justiﬁed, as they produce health,
while the moral principle of health also obligates individual persons to pursue healthy lifestyles and
become healthy citizens. I examine how, in this context of Finnish data-driven medicine, arguments
related to privacy and autonomy become silenced when contrasted with the moral principle of health.
Keywords: data-driven medicine; health; privacy; biobanks; genomic knowledge; autonomy; choice;
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Introduction
Contemporary post-genomic health research is built on large data infrastructures, where
genomic data is combined with, for example, other omics data, electronic patient records,
lifestyle and wellbeing data and register information. The scale and scope of utilizing health-
related data is as unprecedented as the potential associated with it. Nation states as well as
multinational organizations are placing great emphasis on developing methods for harnessing
the potential of health data. The OECD1 has  identiﬁed  health  services  as  one  of  the  sectors
where the adoption of data analytics is seen to have the highest impact in the relative short run.
This especially concerns genomic information and different types of data collected through
digital health applications. The European Commission has highlighted three areas in the ﬁeld
that require further action:
“-  citizens’ secure access to and sharing of health data across borders;
-  better data to advance research, disease prevention and personalised health and care;
-  digital tools for citizen empowerment and person-centred care.”2
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These developments can be grouped under the heading of data-driven medicine. Concepts
linked to data-driven medicine—such as personalized medicine and digital health—are gaining
ground with scientists, health professionals and policy makers in Finland and
internationally.3,4,5,6  What is common with these new rationales of health care is that they are
based on creating vast amounts of information about both individuals and populations. New
health services, medical research and diagnostic tools are created on big data platforms. With
data-driven medicine, it is said that the focus of health care also shifts from treatment of patients
to prediction and prevention of diseases.7, 8 Large amounts of data are thus being collected,
aggregated, connected, transformed, and utilized, to prevent people from getting ill.
Data-driven medicine is characterized as a paradigm change, and its advances have been argued
for by using metaphors such as ‘revolution’, to depict the radical changes envisioned for health
care and patients.9,10,11 The attendant developments have also been analyzed through the
expectations created in discourses around personalized health and genomic medicine.12,13 In
this article, I bring forth a distinctive set of arguments that the proponents of data-driven
medicine use in strategies and public discussion to promote their cause, or ‘revolution’.
I focus on the predominant idea that data-driven medicine enhances peoples’ health, and is
therefore acceptable and desirable. Intensiﬁed health data sourcing,14 attracting international
business to mine health data, and creating new enabling regulations are all justiﬁed as measures
for  achieving  better  health.  In  the  public  discussion  on  data-driven  medicine,  health  as  the
moral principle supports two lines of argument. First of all, aiming toward health and a healthy
society are grounds for justifying the building of new data infrastructures such as biobanks,
and endorsing economic activities and innovation in the health sector. Without data collection,
innovation, and research and development, no new cures can be developed. Secondly, the
moral principle of health obligates individual persons to pursue healthy lifestyles, and health
in general. Healthy people are good and inexpensive citizens. The ideal citizen does not only
know what good health is, but also becomes committed to its fulﬁlment through self-
management and lifestyle choices.15,16  While  these  types  of  reasoning  have  existed  before,
data-driven medicine brings new aspects to the arguments, and binds them together in new
ways. For example, arguments related to privacy and autonomy become framed as secondary,
when contrasted with the moral principle of health.
Because health is at question, it is very difﬁcult to argue against data collection and use. Daniel
Solove has examined the notion of privacy in the setting of national security in the USA, and
how in public discussion, privacy becomes frequently balanced against security—increasing
one lessens the other.17 He argues that it is often believed that people have to trade privacy in
order to be more secure. The same seems to apply to post-genomic, data-driven health. When
opposing arguments such as those related to privacy are balanced against health, arguments for
better health usually win, while those related to privacy become silenced.
I will also show that the predominant line of argumentation prioritizes health and extensive
data gathering and processing over not only privacy, but also the autonomy of the individual.
However, the autonomy of the individual is simultaneously highlighted in prevailing
discourses that emphasize freedom of choice in health promotion and health services. Data-
driven medicine is perceived to enhance freedom of choice, and bring empowerment to
individuals.18,19,20 However, the rationale that places health as the moral principle also
undermines the autonomy of individuals. I analyze this ‘contradiction of autonomy’ and how
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the premises of argumentation make it difﬁcult to combine the two argumentation strategies—
the moral principle of health, and freedom of choice—and concomitantly create coherent and
sustainable health data policy.
These contradictory arguments, and the supremacy of health, are analyzed in the context of
Finnish discussions on genomics, biobanks and personalized medicine as my empirical starting
point, but I also reﬂect the ﬁndings to European and global discussions. I contribute to the
discussions on how to balance individual and communal ethical principles,21,22,23,24,25 not by
taking a normative position, but by demonstrating the difﬁculties in argumentation around data-
driven medicine, to ﬁnd a balance between the two.
Context and Material
The empirical base for my analysis comes from expert discussions in Finland about biobanks
and uses of genomic knowledge and other health data that have gone on since 2013. The
analysis builds especially on three processes in Finland: (1) the implementation of the Biobank
Act26 and its renewal, (2) the drafting and implementation of the National Genome Strategy,
and (3) the process of changing the legislation and practices of secondary use of social  and
health data.
Biobanks are research infrastructures that collect, store and circulate human biological samples
(blood, tissue, urine etc.) and other data from sample donors (lifestyle information, patient
records, register data etc.) for future research purposes. The Biobank Act came to force in
Finland in autumn 2013. The act is internationally unique, as it regulates directly and solely,
biobanks of all types.27 Other than Finland, only few countries, such as Estonia, China and
Taiwan, have speciﬁc biobank legislation.28 The Finnish Biobank Act applies to both public
and private biobanks, and the whole range of biobanks from population to clinical and disease-
based biobanks. The Biobank Act deﬁnes criteria for operating a biobank, such as informed
consent procedures, the return of research results, and access to data by third parties.29
After  the  enforcement  of  the  Biobank Act  in  2013,  ten  biobanks  have  been  established  and
registered, as required by the Act, and they have started to implement the requirements of the
law in their practices. This has not always been easy. There have been many seminars and
events to ponder the problems and possibilities of the Biobank Act,  as well  as the future of
Finnish biobanking. Currently, the biobanks are also participating in the restructuring boom.
There have been some mergers as well, and a cooperative of six clinical biobanks, ‘Biobank
Finland’ has been established.
The second process is the drafting and implementation of the Finnish National Genome
Strategy, ”Improving Health through the Use of Genomic Data,”30 that started in 2014 by the
initiative of the Ministry of Social Services and Health and Sitra, a fund operating under the
Finnish Parliament. The objective of the drafting process was to identify central measures to
guarantee full-scale use of genomic data in healthcare. The strategic vision was outlined as
follows: “In 2020, genomic information will be effectively used in Finland to achieve
population health beneﬁts.” 31 In spring 2016, the government announced that it would support
the aims of the Genome Strategy, including the establishment of a national Genome Centre—
a national reference database and expert infrastructure that brings together all major actors in
genomics in Finland. The establishment of the Genome Centre is currently in progress.
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The third process concerns the drafting of legislation concerning the secondary usage of health
and social data that has been prepared32 and is now in parliamentary discussion. The aim of
this process was to create permissive legislation that enables “full scale utilization” of health,
social service, and wellbeing data of Finns.33 Part of the process has been also to build
infrastructure that supports the utilization of the data. This involves establishment of a single
service and permit operator that combines and processes the data (registers, biobanks,
electronic patient records, etc.) for different uses (research and development, planning, steering
and education), and processes permit applications. The combination of data is made possible
by the personal identiﬁcation number all Finnish residents have.
I have participated in both open and closed seminars and discussions related to biobanks, the
Genome Strategy and health data use between 2013-2018. In addition, I have attended
numerous other seminars, events and discussion forums related to personalized medicine,
digital health technologies and genomic knowledge. I have made notes, and used the
background material and presentation slides to study the lines of argumentation experts use to
promote data-driven medicine. The experts—who are the participants at these events—include
different stakeholders such as: representatives from ministries and funding agencies, regulatory
ofﬁcials, biobank managers, researchers in genomics and biomedicine, medical professionals,
ICT, juridical and ethical experts, and representatives of companies. I have also followed the
discussions related to the subject in the media—articles, tweets and blogs written by
stakeholders, or their interviews in the media—and read document material related to biobanks,
the Genome Strategy and secondary use of health data.
This article focuses on one set of arguments and what kinds of justiﬁcation in support of data-
driven medicine these arguments entail. It does not aim to create a full picture of the discussions
in Finland or internationally. I will not make distinctions between different types of experts
and their argumentation strategies or correlate their arguments to the interests and positions of
different stakeholders.34 This is also due to the fact that, perhaps a bit surprisingly, the type of
argumentation that I present here is used by experts regardless of their position, role or
afﬁliation.  The  emphasis  and  tone  of  argumentation  varies,  but  similar  structures  of
argumentation crosscut the stakeholders, “We are doing this for better health”. There are of
course many other types of arguments related to the promotion of data-driven medicine. I have
chosen to analyze the above mentioned for their predominance, and I want to highlight the
importance of the ethical premises of the arguments that emphasize either the autonomy and
privacy of the individual or the ultimate goal of health made possible through extensive data
gathering and processing.
The Moral Principle of Health
 I focus the prevalent idea that data-driven medicine improves peoples’ health and is therefore
acceptable and desirable. The objective of improving health frames medical research and data-
driven medicine, which are seen to lead directly and unquestionably to better health. This
happens by two means: creating new health innovations and supporting infrastructures, and
encouraging people to actively aim for better personal health.
The starting point of argumentation crystallizes around the idea that, “with data-driven
medicine, we can make people healthier.” Data-driven medicine is often replaced with
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expressions such as genomic knowledge, biomedical research, biobanks or health data, but the
core idea is the same—better health is reached through gathering, combining and using health
data. Demonstrating examples come from the roll-up banners that Finnish biobanks put up in
seminars and events which include slogans such as: “Research for the good of the health of
Finns”; “Help us to build a healthier future”; “Health is the biggest gift of all”; “Action for
better health”; and “Better health through research”.
This kind of advertisement or line of argumentation places health and all  efforts to promote
health as the primary and unconditional objective. Whether medical research, biobanks and
data-driven  medicine  always  lead  to  better  health,  or  even  new cures  and  treatments,  is  not
questioned. Nor is whether all people crave for health above other virtues in life. Research and
innovations  are  regarded  at  face  value  to  result  in  improvements  in  health,  and  so  are  new
infrastructures  such  as  biobanks,  and  legislative  reforms.  Health  as  a  goal  cannot  easily  be
resisted. What could be more important than peoples’ health?
The principle of health also legitimizes the gathering, storing and processing of data. Data is a
source of knowledge for research, and new knowledge is needed to solve problems. To solve
health problems, one only has to gain access to knowledge, and this happens through data.
Data-driven medicine requires information from the individuals as well as from reference
populations. The data is not only explicitly health information such as diagnoses, patient
records, or genomic proﬁles. The perceived promise behind data-driven medicine is in
epigenomics and the possibilities of combining all sorts of data from self-monitoring data, to
school grades or GPS tracking information.35, 36 The moral principle of health therefore
becomes associated with the use of all kinds of data, not only health records.
Databases also offer new possibilities for companies and the medical industry to gain proﬁt,
and develop data-driven business. But leaning on health, as the moral principle, is a more
acceptable line of argumentation than claiming legitimation for producing new innovations and
economic competitiveness, which are also commonly used as arguments for data-driven
medicine.37 Research shows that Finns, among other European citizens, are more skeptical
about health research when it has connections to business, and when it is perceived to be
commercial.38,39
Publicly funded research that is supposed to enhance national health or personal health is
deemed more acceptable. So, even though strategies and discussions are aiming to enhance
Finnish competitiveness in the global genomics market40, it is more convenient to refer to the
underlying principle of health. The suspiciousness of Finns toward big pharma, for example,
is often countered with an argument from the expert side: “Don’t they understand that we need
companies to develop medicine for their illnesses?” Companies and business are needed, to
obtain the ultimate goal of better health. Whenever the commercialization arguments or
rhetoric promoting national innovativeness and competitiveness are questioned, health as the
ultimate goal of companies as well is brought to the fore. International investments in genomic
research  and  development,  for  example,  “are  of  direct  beneﬁt  to  Finns  and  the  Finnish
healthcare system.” 41 So even if Finnish documents and strategies do not always explicitly
name health as the primary and ultimate goal, as it is often overshadowed by economic goals,
health is the moral principle that is referred to.
The other dimension of the moral principle of health is related to the duty of individuals or
citizens to promote their own health. A model of healthy citizens and health promotion has
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been adopted by all industrialized countries—both in so-called liberal and welfare states—
where people are considered to be autonomous, active and responsible partners in managing
their own health.42,43,44 Robert Crawford has written about healthism to describe the increasing
focus on health and the responsibility of the individual for her own health.45 Healthism places
the problem of health and illness at the level of the individual. While healthism is not a new
tendency,46 data-driven medicine offers new possibilities to bring health promotion and
personal responsibility into a novel relationship with more precise and individualized
measures.
Data analytics creates masses of new information for the individual to respond to. This
highlights the moral dimension of personal risk—with more and more personalized
information available, one should take control of one’s life. The data-driven medicine paradigm
thus continues from the idea that people can and should take personal responsibility for their
health, and furthermore deploys a large amount of data to produce more accurate and
personalized possibilities for improving one’s health. The P4 ideology - predictive, preventive,
personalized and participatory medicine - has gained ground in Finland, and the investments
to biobanks, the Genome Centre, and legislative reforms are said to serve the development of
personalized medicine and the empowerment of individuals. Health databases and personalized
analytics will “provide the basis for concrete action by consumers to improve their health as
they observe the impact of life-style decisions.”47
The complexity of Privacy
The uses of personal data and possibilities to individually target health promotion have raised
alarm in relation to the privacy of individuals. Can privacy of individuals be guaranteed in the
databases? Is genome data ever anonymous? But when health is used as the moral principle,
defending privacy arguments becomes difﬁcult. Solove has written about privacy in the context
of national security in the USA, and how in public discussion, privacy becomes commonly
balanced against security in settings in which increasing one lessens the other. He claims that
it is often assumed that people have to make a trade-off. In order to be more secure one has to
be willing to sacriﬁce privacy. Privacy is then viewed as a right of an individual which is
balanced against the common good.48
The same seems to apply to health in the data-driven era. In order to enhance national public
health, or development of medicine, one has to be ready to sacriﬁce personal privacy. If people
are too worried about their privacy and do not participate in biobanks, or share their health and
genomic data for research, they are obstructing the common good and health of others.
Referring to privacy rights becomes associated with negative notions such as selﬁshness and
free riding.49,50 If people do not participate in research, or are not willing to give their data for
innovation purposes for privacy reasons, they will be using services based on other peoples’
data for free. For the good of others, solidarity and even national competitiveness, privacy
becomes a less-valid argument than health.
In Finland, the building of data infrastructures and innovation ecosystems are also framed as
national projects51, which makes opposing them with requests for personal privacy seem futile
and  selﬁsh.  Because  privacy  is  seen  as  an  individual  right  and  the  health  of  all  people  as  a
societal interest, balancing between them is difﬁcult. Solove therefore suggests that privacy
K Snell (2019) Health as the Moral Principle of Post-Genomic Society
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 28(2):201-214
should not be seen only as a right of the individual, but as a social value and something that is
not in opposition to common good.52 Other authors have pointed to the dichotomies and
polarities present in ethical discussion, such as individual vs. community or autonomy vs.
discipline.53, 54 These dichotomies are visible in the discussions around data-driven medicine,
even though it might not be constructive to situate them in those extremities in principle or in
practice. As Solove states: “Sacriﬁcing privacy does not automatically make us more secure.
Not all security measures are invasive of privacy.”55
While privacy is often listed as one value that needs to be secured in data-driven medicine,
there are many other ways of rejecting concerns over privacy in expert arguments or public
discussion. A common way of dismissing peoples’ concerns over privacy is to refer to the idea
that people already voluntarily share all kinds of information. I have heard numerous arguments
where the starting point is that people do not care about privacy, as “they are already sharing
everything” on social media or are sending their saliva samples to be tested in direct-to-
consumer genetic testing companies in the USA. The logic is that biobanking or data-driven
medicine should not therefore be considered as harming people’s privacy in an unprecedented
way. Also Donna Dickenson, in her work on biotechnology and genetics, points to the tendency
to fall  back on the argument:  “What is  the problem, if  that’s what people choose to do?.”56
Genomics, data-driven medicine or biobanks bring nothing new to privacy, goes the argument.
People are willing to voluntarily share their information to many more dubious causes (that
don’t follow health as a moral principle), so why should data-driven medicine be different?
And the argument continues, biobanks and genomic research already need to follow very strict
regulation and data protection principles. The data is much more secure in the hands of Finnish
biobanks and the Finnish health care system (that has peoples’ health as the ultimate goal) than
with consumer genetics companies or large companies such as Google.
The “They are already sharing everything” reasoning is closely connected to what Solove terms
as the “I’ve got nothing to hide” argument. In his analysis on discussions of national security
in the USA, he brings forth a number of examples of how the argument is used to support the
use of personal data. This type of argumentation is also present in the everyday discussions of
people,  as  cited  by  Solove:  “Do  I  care  if  FBI  monitors  my  phone  calls?  I  have  nothing  to
hide.”57 Similar argumentations can be found in the health data ﬁeld. People can consider
themselves to be ordinary and to be living a life that can withstand scrutiny, and they therefore
do not have anything to hide. Data in biobanks and genomic information could be potentially
harmful, but not to an average person with nothing to conceal.58 It is therefore not only the
experts that foster this line of argumentation.
The problem with the “nothing to hide” argument, according to Solove, is that it assumes that
privacy is only about hiding bad things. The tendency here is that other problems related to
privacy—such as discrimination, exclusion or secondary uses of data—do not get
acknowledged. These problems bear different moral components besides or in addition to
health, such as equality. Solove continues that using the “nothing to hide” argument denies the
existence of a privacy problem.59 This applies to the “they already share everything” argument
as well. It rejects the presence of problems related to gathering, storing and disseminating
private information by focusing on the perceived lack of concern of people toward their
personal  information.  Thus,  privacy  is  used  narrowly,  and  becomes  easily  dismissed  by
referring to the perceived conduct and opinions of people who already do not care about
privacy.
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These arguments also resemble the so called ‘post-privacy thinking’, that claims privacy to be
outdated.60,61 It is seen as more valuable to share data than keep it private. A prime example of
this thinking comes from the portal PatientsLikeMe, which is a kind of Facebook for patients,
where you can create a proﬁle based on your disease, symptoms and medications.62
PatientsLikeMe has promoted an openness policy. The idea is that the more you share, the
more you can beneﬁt. So the argumentation goes that sharing data can bring beneﬁts to one’s
health’.  Interestingly,  similar  thinking  is  present  in  the  reforms of  the  Finnish  public  health
care system. By sharing your data, you participate in the common good, and the improvement
of personal and public health. Sharing therefore has a moralistic undertone that implies that it
is good to share 63,64, and if you don’t want to share, you have dubious motives or something
to hide. Sharing your data can also be a condition for receiving personalized health services—
if you don’t share your data, the health care system has inadequate information to treat you of
offer you best possible services.
Another common way of interpreting privacy in a narrow manner is to see privacy as a
technical problem of information security. In many discussions, privacy becomes reduced to a
problem that can be solved by legislation and secure ICT systems, and not a moral concern.
Data security and regulations are assumed to offer privacy protection for the Finnish people.
All social and ethical questions seem to be handled when data security is being taken care off.
When privacy is reduced to only technical and legal protection (or considered as being only
about hiding bad stuff) other questions of privacy become undermined. And there are indeed,
many other types of harm beyond the exposing one’s personal health data, such as issues related
to exclusion from services, misinterpretation of data, and decisional interference.
If privacy is more than just about hiding bad stuff or keeping information secure, what is it
then? Solove claims that privacy “is too complicated a concept to be boiled down to a single
essence”. 65  Therefore he sees that it is more fruitful to talk about privacy through particular
problems, and not as an all-encompassing concept. Helen Nissenbaum has also written about
information gathering and privacy, and developed the concept of contextual integrity.66
Contextual integrity ties protection of privacy to norms of each speciﬁc context and builds on
the idea that information gathering and dissemination should obey the governing norms of the
context.
The contextualization of data becomes a highly relevant issue in the government-led process,
to enable, reorganize, and streamline the secondary use of social and health data in Finland.67
The process aims to bring together all Finnish health and social data (including biobank and
genome data) under one service operator. It is argued that by concentrating data with one
service operator, data security increases, and this enhances the privacy of the individuals. But
if we look at the privacy from the more nuanced viewpoints of Nissenbaum and Solove,
secondary use removes data from its original context and thus creates possibilities for breaches
of privacy.
Autonomy and the Imperative of Health
 In addition to privacy, the idea of autonomy is being balanced against the principle of health.
Concomitantly, the moral principle of health is used to dilute arguments for autonomy. This
becomes apparent in the popular statements that argue: “What right do people have not to
K Snell (2019) Health as the Moral Principle of Post-Genomic Society
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 28(2):201-214
participate, when research can save lives?”. This line of argumentation is based on an idea that
data-driven medicine based on solidarity or a duty to share data, with health as the ultimate
objective, is more valuable than peoples’ autonomous decisions to participate, or not, in
medical research. The discourses sustain the dichotomy between individual autonomy and
common  good.  This  line  of  argumentation  also  presupposes  that  research  will  result  in
improvements in health or at least, has that as an aim. Participation, as such, is therefore seen
as a sign of contributing to health, and nobody should thus be allowed to resist it.
Data-driven medicine requires as much data as possible, and from as many people as possible.
Biobanks need participants, and sometimes their informed consent, to use their samples and
medical data. The Finnish Biobank Act requires all biobanks to ask for an informed consent
from new sample donors. The consent is deﬁned as broad, basically allowing uses for all
medical research and development. Finnish hospital biobanks are based on an idea that in the
future, samples are not only given once to a biobank but are taken routinely during every
procedure—blood test or operation—in the hospital. Data is also gathered cumulatively from
people and from multiple sources and registers. Sustainability of biobanks, and the continuous
accumulation of data, therefore requires input from the public.68
Recruiting and committing people to biobanking, for example, has not been easy. Experts have
become worried, because participation rates are declining in epidemiological research69 and
Finnish biobanks have not been able to recruit as many participants as desired.70 Securing
large-enough participation rates has become one of the major topics in Finnish biobank
discussions  in  the  last  two  years.  As  a  result,  a  new  strand  of  argumentation  emerged  that
promoted the changing of the consent model of biobanks from broad informed consent to
presumed consent with an opt-out clause.71,72 This would mean that all Finns would be biobank
participants by default, unless they speciﬁcally opted-out of the system. In addition, the latest
plan for renewing the Biobank act contains a proposal that would enable sample gathering for
biobanks in connection to routine hospital operations, without the consent of the patient. These
suggestions reveal considerable departures from the previous discussions, where autonomy of
individuals to make a decision about participating to a biobank was deemed crucial, and one
of the best characteristics of the Finnish Biobank Act. One of the main purposes of the Biobank
Act was to secure the privacy and autonomy of the individuals and “to support research that
utilizes human samples, to promote the openness of the use of samples and to secure the
protection of privacy and autonomy in handling the samples.” 73
During the ﬁrst years after the implementation of the Biobank Act, the Act and its deﬁnitions
of broad consent were widely hailed as successful. Finland was seen as having “the best
Biobank Act in the world.” The wide consent model and possibilities for contacting participants
again were viewed as supportive of the health goal, and the broad consent was regarded as a
prerequisite for biobanking. But the legal bases and functioning of wide consent have now been
problematized. The interpretation of the GDPR in Finland supports a view that broad consent
cannot be used as grounds for gathering samples and data. The solution presented in Finland is
to refer to the legal bases of data collection—if data procedures are statutory and deﬁned in
legislation,  informed  consent  is  not  necessary.  The  opt-out  model  would  transform  the
collection of biobank samples and data to resemble register information. Many kinds of register
data are collected from individuals in Finland routinely,  without consent and by referring to
the legislation. It is possible to combine these register and other data sources, using the personal
identiﬁcation number each Finn has.
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As argumentation is shifting from consent to opt-out, the autonomy of individuals is being
subordinated to the need for gathering data. This similarity to register information is supported
by arguing: “Lots of data has been gathered this way already for years.” The argumentation
resembles the above-explored argumentation of “They are already sharing everything.” In this
line of thinking, biobanking and data-driven medicine are not seen to indicate a considerable
change in data collection and sharing practices. Extra protective measures may therefore seem
unnecessary, and genomic information and biobank data could be gathered and combined with
other health and social data without explicit consent from Finns. Another argument has been
presented to promote the opt-out model for biobanks in the name of autonomy. It is claimed
that because informed consent can never be totally informed in the case of biobanks, the
autonomy of individuals becomes respected more through the opt-out model. People are not
asked to commit to something that is unclear, but if they regard biobanking unclear or
problematic they can opt-out. Therefore opt-out is regarded as guaranteeing better possibilities
for individuals to take a stance.
The active, empowered and choice-making citizen has been identiﬁed as a major actor in the
neo-liberal society, new public health movement, and personalized medicine.74,75 The
international strategies for personalized medicine are rooting for empowerment,76 and the
public discussions around possibilities of data-driven medicine also emphasize autonomy and
choice.  Indeed,  autonomy,  choice  and  empowerment  are  also  used  as  arguments  to  support
data-driven medicine in the Finnish discussions. For example, the structural health care reform
ongoing in Finland is also tied closely to enhancing the freedom of choice of individuals to
choose their health care and service providers. Personalized medicine is also seen to increase
the likelihood of people to make better health and life style choices. The new personalized
health promotion logic is closely connected to the value of choice. Choice and autonomy are
used in the same discussions, and by same people who use the health as moral principle
argumentation to suppress individual choices and autonomy.
Dickenson has claimed that autonomy, and its partner, choice, are paramount values and
mantras in personalized medicine, known here as data-driven medicine. She criticizes the loose
use of the concepts. Taking personal choice at face value closes down deeper analysis of facts.
She continues by saying that referring to choice is a lazy argument. 77 Annemarie Mol critiques
not the general concept of choice but the generalization of choice, and how it can be contrasted
with  “no  choice”.  She  points  to  the  practices  and  logics  that  are  behind  referring  to  patient
choice, and how these logics and practices can change the ideal of, and even clash with good
care.78 Similarly, Luca Chiapperino and Giuseppe Testa write that the related concept of
empowerment  is  crucial  to  current  proposals  of  healthcare  reform  across  Europe  and
worldwide. They are also critical of using this notion in argumentation as, according to them,
it is unclear whether empowerment is used for its intrinsic (moral) or instrumental
(legitimation) value, or if it is used solely to support economic motivations. 79 It is therefore
not clear whether the emphasis on choice actually enhances autonomy or if it is only used as a
rhetorical tool for promoting practices that require compliance.
Choice and empowerment are made to serve the objective of health from an apparently
individualistic approach that does not concur with the more communitarian ideas of
participation in biomedicine, including the ideas of solidarity and anti-free-riding, in which
everyone is expected to share their data. In many ways, these discussions form a contradiction
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of autonomy, where the idea of autonomy is simultaneously promoted through choice, and
silenced by focussing on common need to enhance data-driven medicine.
Conclusions
As I have demonstrated, argumentation that relies on the moral principle of health tends to
undermine the arguments related to autonomy and privacy. While these latter concepts have
been associated with individual rights and empowerment in the context of data-driven and
personalized medicine, they seem to be difﬁcult to combine with the more communal
approaches that are supported by the moral principle of health, such as common good, public
health or national competitiveness. Finding a balance between individual and communal
ethical principles and dichotomies such as autonomy vs. discipline or private vs. public has
been called for by several authors.80 It has been pointed out that data is gathered from
individuals but also applied to large populations, which makes it necessary to think about ethics
as related to both individuals and collectives. 81 My analysis of public discussions around data-
driven medicine in Finland demonstrates that arguments used to support its development are
contradictory and fail to ﬁnd a balance between the polarized arguments.
The moral principle of health supports both the building of data infrastructures and ecosystems
and the enhancement of personalized health promotion. With more personalized information
accessible, one has better possibilities to take charge of one’s health. The data-driven medicine
paradigm thus continues from the idea that people can and should take personal responsibility
for their health, and provides a large amount of data to produce more accurate and personalized
possibilities for improving one’s health. While in some instances, this puts emphasis on the
autonomy of individuals, in others, the imperative of health silences these arguments. Data
collection for a national project that exists for better health does not allow for choice-making
free-riders, but at the same time, personalized medicine empowers people to make healthy
choices. There is a seeming contradiction of autonomy at the discursive level. While other
arguments adhere to the neo-liberal model of individualized healthy citizens, a communal
approach emphasizing common good and populations over individuals is simultaneously
articulated, but without making these arguments compatible.
A similar balancing act is present when it comes to the notion of privacy. While privacy is seen
as a highly relevant issue in relation to data-driven medicine, it is at the same time being
silenced and not considered to be a relevant moral argument. This happens ﬁrst of all by
referring to the moral principle of health that makes health a superior goal in relation to others.
In this argumentation, privacy is regarded as a private good and contrasted to the common
good. In addition, privacy is often interpreted as a technical problem instead of a moral one.
Taking care of information security safeguards personal privacy. But as many authors have
demonstrated, privacy is a more multifaceted and social phenomenon that cannot be reduced
to technical security. Nor can it be dismissed be referring to arguments such as “nothing to
hide”, “people are already sharing their data” or “data has been gathered for decades already.”
Some authors claim that there has been too much emphasis on individuals’ rights, while others
claim that data-driven medicine suppresses them. In this article, I’m not taking a normative
stance for, or against privacy, choice or autonomy, as such, but aim to demonstrate how the
loose use of the concepts in parallel with the moral principle of health makes argumentation
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and thus responsible policy development extremely difﬁcult. Concepts like solidarity have
been presented as solutions to overcome the gap.82 But applying solidarity into practice can be
difﬁcult and it requires sensitivity toward different contexts. The solidarity approach has also
been criticized for overlooking the actual conditions and possibilities of people to participate
in decision-making and collaborative processes.83 Solidarity can easily become a similar
normative imperative to health.
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